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THE POLITICIZATION OF LEGAL
EXPERTISE IN THE TTIP NEGOTIATION
FERNANDA G. NICOLA∗
I
INTRODUCTION
In pursuing a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with
the European Union (EU) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Obama
Administration aims to create economic growth while strengthening the
Western bloc to contain the rising Chinese power and the regulatory challenges
1
posed by the expansion of the Chinese markets. In entering into such a
bilateral, rather than multilateral, negotiating framework, the U.S. and EU
administrations are choosing an alternative route to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) for international cooperation. Beyond the geopolitical
implications of TTIP, the battle turf for its negotiation is embedded in a
complex regulatory web of private and public governance mechanisms in which
administrative legal experts and their ideological orientation play a large, and
often unspoken, role. This article examines legal tools and ideological choices
that administrative law experts have put forward to respond to the demands of
civil society and politicians regarding the need for greater transparency and
participation in trade negotiation. Although trade negotiations happen in
secret, negotiators on both sides of the Atlantic have strategically used notions
of transparency and participation in administrative law to advance their
respective bargaining power and to gain more legitimacy toward the general
public.
One of the central goals of TTIP revolves primarily around deepening
international regulatory cooperation (IRC); namely, eliminating inefficient and
unnecessary incompatibilities created by differing administrative structures that
burden industries and trade across the Atlantic. This notion was already present
in President Obama’s Executive Order (EO) 13,609 issued in 2012, which aimed
to promote IRC as a way to ensure that divergent regulatory approaches
adopted between U.S. agencies and their foreign counterparts do not impair the
Copyright © 2015 by Fernanda G. Nicola.
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ability of companies to export and compete on a global level. In trying to
reconcile the need for regulatory efficiency with safety, health, labor, and
environmental standards, the EO portrayed IRC as a mechanism aimed at
identifying protective approaches to “reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary
3
differences in regulatory requirements.”
Led by the European Commission and its trade negotiators, the EU has
been willing to partner with the United States on equal footing, rather than
simply entering into a free-trade agreement, in order to identify commonalities
4
on horizontal regulatory issues. Partnering as equals in a regulatory dialogue,
however, has created not only numerous tensions between the two
5
administrations but also several roadblocks in the TTIP negotiations. The
Commission faces political and technical pressures from the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) that has put forward the advantages of its
regulatory system as more efficient and transparent with streamlined cost6
benefit procedures. On the other hand, the Commission prides itself on its
methodological pluralism in carrying out impact assessments and its proactive
and more democratic attempt to involve large groups of civil society
7
representatives in regulatory processes.
While trade negotiators have been busy reconciling these regulatory
differences, TTIP has sparked promises and criticisms from businesses, workers,
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), as well as from believers of
multilateralism in international trade circles, because of the impact of TTIP on
8
third countries left out of the negotiation. Some have applauded, and others
2. Exec. Order No. 13,609, 3 C.F.R. 26413 (2012).
3. Id.; see also Paul R. Verkuil & Reeve T. Bull, The Administrative Conference’s Role in
Supporting Regulatory Cooperation, Administrative Conference of the United States (Dec. 2, 2014).
4. See TTIP Round 9 – final day press conference - Comments by EU Chief Negotiator Ignacio
Garcia Bercero, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/april/tradoc_153394.pdf.
5. In this respect, ensuring joint transatlantic leadership in the development of global norms
and standards goes hand in hand with building progressively a more integrated transatlantic
marketplace. Critically these rules and institutions would not be credible if we fail to deliver
the concrete and measurable reduction in costs for business through mutual recognition or by
other means to avoid the unnecessary duplication of regulatory costs.
Karel de Gucht, EU Trade Commissioner, Remarks on TTIP Ahead of the Second Round of
Negotiations, DELEGATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE U.S., http://www.euintheus.org/pressmedia/eu-trade-commissioner-karel-de-gucht-on-ttip-ahead-of-the-second-round-of-negotiations/ (last
visited Dec. 31, 2014).
6. When we talk about regulation and standards, we are talking about how to bridge the
divergences between two well-regulated markets, not about launching a broad deregulatory
agenda. We are focused on reducing unnecessary costs that damage our collective
competitiveness in an increasingly competitive global economy, perhaps resulting in what my
former colleague, Cass Sunstein, has called “simpler” regulation.
Michael Froman, U.S. Trade Representative, Remarks on the United States, the European Union, and
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Sept. 30, 2013),
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2013/september/froman-us-eu-ttip.
7. See Anne Meuwese, Constitutional Aspects of Regulatory Coherence in TTIP: An EU
Perspective, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015, at 160.
8. Michelle Egan, Is TTIP Really That Different? The TTIP: The Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership between the European Union and the United States, in THE TTIP 19, 25 (Joaquin
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criticized, the high economic and employment benefits calculated by experts on
9
both sides to justify the optimistic opening of the negotiation. While trade
liberalization politics are increasingly challenged by politicians in Congress with
the approval of Trade Promotion Authority and in the European Parliament,
the procedures and ideological choices in IRC are portrayed as a technical
realm in which lawyers attempt to extrapolate best practices or pragmatically
reconcile conflicting procedures.
The understanding that TTIP will likely revolve around IRC worries
politicians and civil society alike because of the constraint that this could create
for domestic regulation and a resulting lack of transparency and participation in
10
the negotiation. In response to democratic-deficit and transparency concerns,
trade negotiators are using the technical language of regulatory cooperation
rather than convergence to show how their respective administrative law
regimes best reflect the values enshrined in Western liberal democracies, such
as transparency, openness, and participation in decisionmaking. In this process,
lawyers are tasked to reconcile administrative law divergences by addressing
“best” models or “experimentalist” approaches to overcome the regulatory
roadblocks in TTIP.
Part I offers a historical roadmap to understand the initial steps in
transatlantic trade and regulatory approximation between the United States
and the European Economic Community. With the establishment of a
transatlantic dialogue in the 1970s, the European Commission secured a firstmover advantage vis-à-vis the U.S. administration through its ability to regulate
a complex multilevel governance regime and the principle of mutual
recognition. Rather than an impediment to transatlantic trade, the European
regulatory model put forward by the Commission was perceived as an asset to
the regulation of complex sectors. Later, with the limited success of mutual
recognition agreements (MRAs) and the launch of the High Level Regulatory
Cooperation Forum (HLRCF) under the Bush Administration, this new phase
of coordination under the leadership of the HLRCF marked the increasing
participation of administrative agencies under the lead of the White House. At
this point, the U.S. administration was able to secure a first-mover advantage in
transatlantic regulatory cooperation. The shifts in bargaining power between
the EU and U.S. administrations was based on contingent and often external
situations rather than the result of “best” or more “efficient” internal regulatory
11
practices in their respective administrative processes.
Roy & Roberto Dominguez eds., 2014).
9. See WERNER RAZA, JAN GRUMILLER, LANCE TAYLOR, BERNHARD TRÖSTER & RUDI VON
ARNIM, ASSESS TTIP: ASSESSING THE CLAIMED BENEFITS OF THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND
INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (TTIP) FINAL REPORT 5–8 (2014).
10. Kal Raustiala, Domestic Institutions and International Regulatory Cooperation: Comparative
Responses to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 49 WORLD POL. 482, 488 (1997).
11. See generally Abraham Newman & Elliot Posner, Putting the EU in Its Place: Policy Strategies
and the Global Regulatory Context, 22 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1316 (2015) (addressing the embeddedness
of the Global Regulatory context).

NICOLA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

178

1/8/2016 2:40 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 78:175

Part II analyzes the regulatory tools and ideological conflicts that trade
negotiators need to reconcile to achieve regulatory cooperation in TTIP. The
USTR and the Commission have promoted different regulatory tools for IRC
(negative versus positive lists, soft versus hard law), as well as different valuebased approaches to regulatory practice (democratic participation versus
efficiency). Throughout the TTIP negotiation, lawyers have worked closely with
trade negotiators to reconcile divergences in horizontal regulatory practices.
Part III shows how the work of scholars has attempted to reconcile IRC
under the label of global administrative law (GAL). In light of the critiques to
GAL, more recently, scholars have replaced universal approaches with more
contingent and pragmatic approaches to what they call global experimentalist
governance (GXG). Rather than favoring legal convergence in GAL or legal
experimentalism in GXG—on the conflicts arising in IRC, this article suggests a
different path. By focusing on each conflict arising in horizontal regulatory
issues these should be understood by scholars as the result of an ideological
12
trade-off between lawyers and a bargaining tool for negotiators.
Part IV shows how the general principles of transparency, openness, and
participation in administrative law have become a bargaining chip for TTIP
negotiators regardless of the principles’ distributive consequences. This part
compares EU and U.S. regulatory approaches through a “hermeneutic of
13
suspicion.” Rather than a neutral approach geared toward “better” or
“experimentalist” forms of governance, it foregrounds the political choices of
the negotiators and the distributive consequence of the regulatory practices
promoted on different private and public entities ranging from individuals to
civil society.
II
THE HISTORY OF TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION
A. From Multilateralism to Bilateralism
Since the 1930s, trade agreements have been designed to eliminate border
measures, lower tariffs, and address “indirect protectionism” as goals carried
out by GATT article III—the quintessential national treatment rule which
14
eliminates discrimination against foreign products. In the 1970s, governments
were committed to going beyond protectionist regulations and addressing the
so-called “increasingly regulatory divergence” and unnecessary barriers to

12. See Giulio Napolitano, Conflicts and Strategies in Administrative Law, 12 INT’L J. CONST. L. 35
(2014).
13. See BRIAN LEITNER, The Hermeneutics of Suspicions: Recovering Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud,
in THE FUTURE OF PHILOSOPHY 74–104 (2004).
14. SIMON LESTER, THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGIME IN GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 4 (2011); Simon Lester and Inu Barbee, The Challenge of Cooperation: Regulatory
Trade Barriers in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 847, 859
(2013).
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15

trade. The role of international trade agreements was expanded to set, at the
global level, the standards adopted by domestic regulators. Through IRC trade,
negotiators could directly address the relationship between domestic
regulations and international trade.
In the 1980s, conflicting logics of trade liberalization and social market
regimes led to an expansion of IRC with a focus on domestic regulation’s
16
impediment to international trade.
The scope of trade and investment
agreements grew beyond border measures such as tariff and quota controls. The
main barriers remaining to international trade were alternately referred to as
nontariff barriers, “behind the border” barriers, or simply as domestic
regulation which has become the center of attention in international trade
17
negotiations. In transatlantic trade relations, multinational businesses were
worried about duplicative compliance costs, whereas the United States alleged
that the changing European single market would offer a competitive advantage
18
to EU firms at the expense of their competitors.
As a response, the European Community (EC) and the U.S. administration
set up institutionalized dialogues on different governance levels to prevent
unilateral implementation of domestic regulation that could hamper
19
transatlantic trade. The 1990 Transatlantic Declaration “committed both sides
to address[ing] and solv[ing] problems of common interest, including regulatory
barriers, resulting in annual reports in which each side set forth its trade
20
grievances against the other.” This Declaration called for mutual informationsharing and cooperation on important political and economic matters. This
collaboration was to be achieved through biannual consultations between U.S.
and EU officials, briefings by the EU Presidency to the U.S. representatives at
21
the ministerial level, and cooperation between legislators. When the EC began
its internal market program in the early 1990s, the United States was concerned
that progress toward EC-wide standards would create a “Fortress Europe” that

15. Alberto Alemanno, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Parliamentary
Dimension of Regulatory Cooperation 5 (2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/
join/2014/433847/EXPO-AFET_ET(2014)433847_EN.pdf.
16. George A. Bermann et al., Introduction, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY CO-OPERATION:
LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS 1, 14 (George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen &
Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2000).
17. Suzanne Berger, Introduction, in NATIONAL DIVERSITY AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM 1, 16
(Suzanne Berger & Ronald Dore eds., 1996).
18. Gregory Shaffer, Managing U.S.–EU Trade Relations Through Mutual Recognition and Safe
Harbor Agreements: ‘New’ and ‘Global’ Approaches to Transatlantic Economic Governance?, 9
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29, 37 (2002).
19. OLIVER ZIEGLER, EU REGULATORY DECISION MAKING AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED
STATES: TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION AS A GATEWAY FOR U. S. ECONOMIC
INTERESTS? 68 (2012).
20. DAVID VOGEL, BARRIERS OR BENEFITS? REGULATION IN TRANSATLANTIC TRADE 9
(1997).
21. DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION, THE TRANSATLANTIC
TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP AND THE PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSION OF REGULATORY
COOPERATION 25 (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2423562.
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American businesses would not be able to penetrate.
The U.S. administration urged the Commission to permit American-based
23
firms to participate in setting standards and certifying compliance with them.
Transatlantic regulatory cooperation began in May 1992 when the Commission
agreed to establish procedures for the participation of U.S. firms in the
European standard-settings bodies as well as to negotiate MRAs for product
24
safety and quality. The Commission released a report in 1992 following the
Transatlantic Declaration, urging an “in-depth bilateral dialogue” to reduce
25
trade barriers. On both sides, the administrations undertook dialogues,
uncovering differences in substantive policy, regulatory style, and procedural
26
obstacles.
In the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the newly created EU
established the Unit for Regulatory Relations with the United States within the
Director-General for External Relations, which, in turn, established the EU–
U.S. Inter-Service Group, consisting of representatives from most DirectoratesGeneral of the Commission, which was responsible for coordinating,
27
overseeing, and promoting regulatory cooperation with the United States.
In November 1995, the Seville Conference, under the auspices of the
Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) established a Transatlantic Advisory
Committee on Standards, Certification, and Regulatory Policy to work jointly
toward a new regulatory model based on the optimistic principle “approved
28
once, and accepted everywhere.” The TABD was a business-led government–
business forum initiated by the U.S. Department of Commerce and aided by the
29
Commission. The TABD’s goal was not only to lower trade and investment
barriers across the Atlantic but also to achieve a “barrier-free transatlantic
30
market.” In December 1995, the Clinton Administration established the New
Transatlantic Agenda, aimed to prioritize economic ties and transform the
31
transatlantic relationship from one of consultation to one of joint action.
22. Id. at 8.
23. See MICHELLE EGAN, CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN MARKET: STANDARDS, REGULATION
AND GOVERNANCE (2001).
24. Vogel, supra note 20, at 9 (quoting George Bermann, Regulatory Cooperation between the
European Commission and U.S. Administrative Agencies, 9 ADMINISTRATIVE L. J. 972 (1996)).
25. Bermann, supra note 24, at 957–58.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Vann H. Wilber & Paul T. Eichbrecht, Transatlantic Trade, the Automotive Sector: The Role of
Regulation in a Global Industry, Where We Have Been and Where We Have to Go, How Far Can EU–
US Cooperation Go Toward Achieving Regulatory Harmonization?, in SYSTEMIC IMPLICATIONS OF
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION AND COMPETITION 165, 176 (Simon J. Evenett &
Robert M. Stern eds., 2011).
EUROPEAN
COMM’N,,
30. EU–USA
Regulatory
Cooperation,
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/cooperating-governments/usa/regulatorycooperation (last visited Dec. 31, 2014).
31. Alberto Alemanno, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the
Parliamentary Dimension of Regulatory Cooperation 25 (2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
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Trade negotiators then tried to craft mutual recognition agreements that
32
would address technical and other nontariff barriers to trade. Essentially,
negotiators tried to create TABD’s transatlantic marketplace in one swift
stroke with what domestic administrations perceived as heterodox legal tools.
Critics viewed the list of deliverables as overly bureaucratic and failing to
address and solve major trade obstacles in the realm of regulatory cooperation.
In addition, more pressing foreign policy issues in the Balkans and China
33
pushed the transatlantic relationship lower on the trade agenda.
B. The MRAs under the Leadership of the European Commission
In the late 1990s, regulatory cooperation under the rubric of
“harmonization” appeared as a natural outgrowth of EU law, in which a
supranational administrative law coordinated the legal regimes of its member
34
states and their regulatory compatibility. The EU represents one of the world’s
most extensive efforts to coordinate regulatory standards across levels of
governments that demonstrated wide expertise in creating better cooperation
among different regulators. As the evolving supranational regulatory
environment in the EU changed the expectations of firms in both the EU and
United States, the political institutions on each side of the Atlantic magnified
these public pressures for greater cooperative regulation to achieve trade
35
liberalization.
In 1996, the Chicago Conference issued a declaration stating that “certain
regulatory requirements, in particular duplicative testing and certification
procedures and widely divergent technical regulations and standards, were no
longer sustainable in terms of resources or results and were not suited to the
36
realities of the global marketplace.” In 1997, TABD issued a priorities paper
noting “several sectors consider completion of a [MRA] package to be a key
37
demonstration of the effectiveness of the TABD process.” In May 1997, an
38
agreement on conformity assessment was released. This mutual recognition
agreement meant “once a product receives a stamp of approval on one side of
39
the Atlantic, it could be automatically sold on the other side as well.”
In May 1998, the EU and the United States launched the Transatlantic
Economic Partnership (TEP) with the aim of furthering bilateral relations with

RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/433847/EXPOAFET_ET(2014)433847_EN.pdf.
32. Tyson Barker, For Transatlantic Trade, This Time Is Different: Why the Latest U.S.–EU Trade
Talks Are Likely to Succeed, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Feb. 26, 2013).
33. Id.
34. See generally PETER LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY 150 (2010).
35. VOGEL, supra note 20, at 59.
36. Id. at 8.
37. Id.
38. VOGEL, BARRIERS OR BENEFITS: REGULATION IN TRANSATLANTIC TRADE 12 (1997).
39. Id. (citing Brian Coleman, U.S., EU Draft Pact on Trade-Product Standards, WALL ST. J. (May
29, 1997)).
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40

an “ambitious” program of regulatory cooperation. “The TEP Action Plan
called for action to address technical barriers to trade in goods, including
improving the dialogue between EU and U.S. regulators. On the basis of the
TEP Action Plan, the Commission and the U.S. government developed
Guidelines for Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency,” encouraging
41
agency-to-agency cooperation between regulatory authorities on both sides.
The aim was to achieve greater convergence of technical rules through a
42
number of sectoral or vertical and horizontal regulatory dialogues. Meanwhile,
intense academic discussions on the possibility of borrowing administrative
cultures sought to transplant regulatory practices from one side of the Atlantic
43
to the other.
For instance, in 1997, during the negotiation of several MRAs, lawyers
relied on a principle that was directly borrowed from the Commission’s notion
of mutual recognition. For the Commission, inspired by the European Court of
Justice Judgement of Cassis de Dijon (1979), mutual recognition became central
44
to solving the obstacles of transatlantic regulatory cooperation. Rather than
requiring further harmonization, mutual recognition required recognition of
each other’s certification of products, focusing on the results of conformity
assessment procedures and presupposing equivalence between respective
45
regulatory standards. If “managed,” mutual recognition entails that products
are only tested once for similar processing and can freely circulate between
46
trading partners.
Even though mutual recognition could advance regulatory cooperation, it is
not a form of standards recognition, because it does not affect the substance of
47
the regulation. Even though MRAs covered a broad variety of products
40. Mark Pollack, The New Transatlantic Agenda at Ten: Reflections on an Experiment in
International Governance, 43 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 899, 907 (2005).
41. EU–USA Regulatory Cooperation, supra note 30.
42. Tamara Takacs, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation in Trade: Objectives, Challenges and
Instruments for Economic Governance, in A TRANSATLANTIC COMMUNITY OF LAW: LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EU AND US LEGAL ORDERS 158, 170–73
(Elaine Fahey & Deirdre Curtin eds., 2014).
43. Francesca Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European Community Rulemaking: A Call for
Notice and Comment in Comitology, 40 HARV. INT’L L. J. 451, 451–56 (1999).
44. See Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral A.G. v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 1979
E.C.R. 00649; Gerhard Lohan, Integrating Regulatory Cooperation into the EU System, in
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY CO-OPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS
405–30 (George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2000). Lohan speaks
particularly to production methods, performance and design requirements, testing and conformity
assessment, labeling, and recycling and waste management.
45. Alemanno, supra note 31, at 32.
46. See Kalypso Nicolaïdes, Kir Forever? The Journey of a Political Scientist in the Landscape of
Mutual Recognition, in THE PAST AND FUTURE OF EU LAW: THE CLASSICS OF EU LAW REVISITED
ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ROME TREATY (Miguel Poiares Maduro & Loïc Azoulai eds.,
2010).
47. See Tamara Takacs, Regulatory Cooperation in Transatlantic Trade Relations, in TRADE
LIBERALISATION AND STANDARDISATION—NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE ‘LOW POLITICS’ OF EU
FOREIGN POLICY 75, 83 (Marisa Cremona & Tamara Takacs eds., 2013).
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included in the six sectoral annexes (telecommunications, pharmaceuticals,
electronics, electromagnetic compatibility, sport boats, and medical devices),
these agreements succeeded in increasing market access for some goods but not
for others. As many noticed, a highly managed mutual recognition was “far
48
from automatic” and still required cumbersome procedures in its application.
In several cases, described in great detail in Gregory Shaffer’s work, the
failure of implementation of the agreements in areas important for EU
exporters (electrical safety, medical devices, and pharmaceuticals) created
49
transatlantic tensions between the trading partners. As a result, MRAs were
not as successful in EU–U.S. relations as was mutual recognition adopted by the
50
Commission within the EU Internal Market.
The lesson was that existing regulatory divergences ought to be taken
seriously to show that there are different regulatory regimes, cultures, and
preferences at stake, so that rather than a harmonization approach, regulators
ought to justify their own choices while being open to experimentation.
Through the MRAs and later on with the 2000 Safe Harbor Privacy Principles,
the EU model of regulatory cooperation was slowly influencing U.S. regulatory
approaches so that regulatory convergence “tended toward EC—and not
51
U.S.—regulatory practices.” Among the reasons, as Shaffer puts it, was the
ability of the Commission derived from its practical experience to work in a
multiplicity of languages and national administrative cultures, as well as in the
52
growing EU market power.
The MRAs successfully globalized a model based on the argument of
enhanced administrability and allowed flexibility in reconciling cultural and
technological challenges. In addition, MRAs rejected the attack from the Left,
well-known in European circles, that while mutual recognition alleviated the
harmonization burden, it triggered a race to the bottom within the internal
market. As scholars have shown, mutual recognition came “in differently
shaped bottles” depending on the political and legal elites negotiating the
agreements and on the historical meanings of Cassis understood as a managed
53
mutual recognition idea. Regardless of its success during this round of the
transatlantic negotiations, the Commission secured a first-mover advantage
with respect to its U.S. counterparts.
C. The High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum under the U.S. Leadership
With the creation of the EU–U.S. HLRCF in 2005, agencies on both sides of
48. See Nicolaïdes, supra note 46, at 453 (explaining how mutual trust and technical harmonization
comes in “differently shaped bottles” and also “in shades of red”).
49. See Shaffer, supra note 18, at 29; see also Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, Who
Governs?, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 287, 303 (2001).
50. Alemanno, supra note 31, at 31.
51. Shaffer, supra note 18).
52. Shaffer, supra note 49, at 41.
53. See Christian Joerges, The Challenges of Europeanization in the Realm of Private Law: A Plea
for New Legal Discipline, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 149 (2004); Nicolaïdis, supra note 46, at 447.
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the Atlantic aimed to strengthen the exchange of best regulatory practice across
specific sectors. “The dialogue helps bridge gaps where responsibilities in the
two administrations do not correspond exactly, and allows for early engagement
54
on new emerging regulatory issues.” The HLRCF was co-chaired by the
Director-General of Enterprise and Industry at the Commission and the
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Office
55
of Management and Budget (OMB) in the White House. The HLRCF also
engaged with stakeholders in public sessions, which now form part of its regular
meetings. These sessions informed businesses and consumers about the results
of the HLRCF’s work while providing a platform for stakeholders to engage in
56
discussions with officials from both sides. By referring to horizontal
cooperation on cross-cutting issues, as opposed to vertical or sector-specific
issues, the HLRCF sanctioned horizontal regulatory cooperation as part of its
mission. This dialogue among regulators focused on a variety of bilateral
activities to share information, ideas on “better” regulatory approaches,
57
methods of regulatory analysis, and reform.
The Bush Administration sought to break down regulatory barriers in
transatlantic trade. Allied with Chancellor Merkel in Germany, the Bush
Administration successfully established the Transatlantic Economic Council
(TEC). This high-level political body aimed to promote economic integration
58
within the Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration. The
TEC was meant to bring U.S. and EU economies together, “primarily through
regulatory cooperation in areas from accounting to electric vehicles and
59
nanotechnology.” Even though TEC has achieved results in select areas, these
have not met expectations due to insufficient political support and the effort
quickly failed over a dispute on the infamous issue of the United States
60
exporting chlorine-washed chicken.
The road to TTIP began in November 2011 when “the EU–U.S. High Level
Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG) established by TEC was tasked
to identify and assess options for strengthening the EU–U.S. economic
relationship, including opportunities for enhancing the compatibility of
61
regulations and standards.” The Obama Administration was simultaneously
reaching out to other trading partners to explore bilateral regulatory
62
cooperation. In May 2012, the presidential EO 13,609 on IRC was announced

54. Europe, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira_irc_europe (last visited
Dec. 31, 2014).
55. Office of Management and Budget, Europe: United States–European Union High-Level
Regulatory Cooperation Forum (2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira_irc_europe.
56. Id.
57. Alemanno, supra note 31, at 28.
58. Id.
59. Barker, supra note 32.
60. Id.
61. EU–USA Regulatory Cooperation, supra note 30.
62. Christopher Sands, Harmonizing the Border: Increase Jobs by Harmonizing Regulations:
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at the joint Administrative Conference of the United States and the U.S.
63
Chamber of Commerce workshop. The order was based in part on ACUS
Recommendation 2011-6 and required all executive agencies to consider
64
international cooperation in all of their regulatory functions.
By February 2013, HLWG released its final report; two days later, President
Obama, the President of the EC, and the President of the Commission,
announced that they would launch a negotiation with the aim of achieving a
65
comprehensive transatlantic trade agreement. Negotiations began in mid-2013.
During the second round of negotiations, concluded on November 15, 2013,
“both sides agreed on the importance of horizontal rules and specific
66
commitments in sectors.” Since then, horizontal cooperation addressing IRC
architecture and mechanisms has become an extremely technical issue under
the prerogative of administrative lawyers.
The new institutional framework that trade negotiators have put forward for
the emerging megaregional free trade agreements ranging from TPP, TTIP, and
the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the
EU relies on a modest administrative and implementation structure geared
toward facilitating regulatory cooperation rather than new regulations. In this
respect negotiators and lawyers alike have spent a lot of effort to define the
term “regulatory cooperation” as something different from and more flexible
than “convergence” or “harmonization” as used profusely by the EU and the
WTO.
In May 2015, the EU draft of the horizontal chapter aimed to promote
regulatory cooperation through improved regulatory exchange of information,
commitment to good regulatory practices, and the creation of a long-term
67
institutional framework. In its proposal the Commission endorses the creation
of a regulatory cooperation body, which would facilitate exchange of
information through early warnings in order to avoid unnecessary
incompatibilities. The regulatory cooperation body will monitor and review the
implementation of regulation in the different sectors included in TTIP and
68
identify new opportunities for cooperation. Even though such a body will not

Restoring Respect for the Law in Canada–U.S. Commerce: The Regulatory Cooperation Council So Far,
37 CAN.–U.S. L. J. 319, 319–20 (2012).
63. International Regulatory Cooperation, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES—RESEARCH
PROJECTS,
http://www.acus.gov/research-projects/international-regulatorycooperation (last visited Dec. 31, 2014).
64. Id.
65. EU–U.S.
High
Level
Working
Group
on
Jobs
and
Growth,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150519.pdf (last visited Sept 10, 2015).
66. A Second Round TTIP Concludes, WASH. TRADE DAILY, Nov. 18, 2013, at 1.
67. See Detailed Explanation on the EU Proposal for a Chapter on Regulatory Cooperation, EUR.
COMM’N (May 6, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153431.1.1%20Detail
%20explanation%20of%20the%20EU%20proposal%20for%20a%20Chapter%20of%20reg%20coop.
pdf.
68. See Articles 14–16, Establishment of the Regulatory Cooperation Body in the Commissions’
Initial Provisions for Regulatory Cooperation, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/february/
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69

have the power to adopt legal acts, scholars and civil society groups have
raised all sorts of issues with regard to its composition, its transparency, and its
70
authority vis-à-vis domestic or EU decision-making processes.
III
REGULATORY TOOLS AND IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICTS IN IRC
A. Negative versus Positive List and the Race to the Bottom
For some scholars, IRC consists of a set of instruments for multinational
corporations and for small and medium enterprises to reduce the cost of
compliance with multiple sets of product regulations and standards across
71
different economies. Through more effective government regulations, IRC
72
exists to allow businesses to more efficiently engage in international trade.
Within this definition, nothing limits the set of means employed to achieve
73
IRC. Considered broadly, such means can include the study, design,
monitoring, enforcement, and ex post management of regulations, whether in
74
binding or voluntary forms. In addition, the forms of IRC can vary in type
while taking different forms: from regulatory convergence to harmonization,
from mutual recognition of regulations across borders to coordination or
cooperation in the form of joint study, and from mere information exchange to
75
generally thoughtful consideration of trading partners.
Irrespective of the existence of transatlantic institutions and dialogues for
regulatory cooperation, the challenges to overcome regulatory differences
76
remain substantial. A significant example that has emerged in the TTIP
negotiation was the different approach to liberalization used by trade
negotiators. The USTR follows a “negative list approach” that explicitly
mentions the restrictions that ought to be eliminated: the so-called “list it or
77
lose it” approach often criticized by labor groups. In contrast, the EU uses a
“positive list approach,” which aims to stimulate broader market access
commitments that leave open the inclusion of new topics during the
tradoc_153120.pdf.
69. Commission Introduction to the EU Legal Text on Regulatory Cooperation in TTIP (Feb. 10,
2015),http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/february/tradoc_153119.1.1%20Regulatory%20cooper
ation%20intro%20to%20EU%20legal%20text.pdf.
70. See Meuwese, supra note 7, at 10–11.
71. RAYMOND J. AHEARN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34717, TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY
COOPERATION: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 4 (2009).
72. IRC has also been defined as efficiency gains “without the use of additional resources,” which
seems unrealistically limiting, given the obvious investments of government resources in IRC. Adam C.
Schlosser & Reeve T. Bull, Regulatory Cooperation in the TTIP, REG BLOG (Aug. 27, 2013),
http://www.regblog.org/2013/08/27/27-schlosser-reeve-ttip/.
73. OECD, infra note 101 at 22–25.
74. Id.
75. Bermann, supra note 16, at 14.
76. Egan, supra note 8.
77. Id.
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78

negotiations.
In the context of TTIP, the EU has proposed a hybrid approach for trade in
services, using positive listing for market access and negative listing for national
79
treatment. The USTR, however, has used a negative listing for services in the
80
past and appears to support a negative listing in TTIP as well. One issue of
contention was the audiovisual sector, because under the negative list approach,
negotiators would not have known what future technological developments may
81
be included in current concessions. Such contention led the European
Parliament, influenced by industries as well as governments under the lead of
France, to convince the Commission that the audiovisual sector should be
82
excluded from the vertical competences of TTIP.
Scholars, politicians, and civil society groups in the EU and in the United
States, however, have feared that transatlantic regulatory cooperation enhances
a race to the bottom scenario in which exporting corporations will be able to
take advantage of trade agreements to move their operations freely to the most
favorable, or least stringent, of several regulatory jurisdictions, while continuing
83
to export to all. At the same time, the affected regulators must compete to
reduce the stringency of their standards or risk lost competiveness or the loss of
84
operations. In the United States, officials and lawmakers have opposed
including provisions regulating financial services into trade agreements such as
the TTIP out of the concern that including this sector will weaken existing U.S.
85
safeguards such as the Dodd–Frank Act, resulting in a race to the bottom.
The potential for a race to the bottom is typically explored in the context of
corporate interests over environmental regulations, consumer-protections, and
86
public-sector services but applies to any area in which corporate interests
might overwhelm regulatory stringency. In the EU, the privatization of
78. Id. at 5.
79. Len Bracken, EU’s Leaked Services Offer for TTIP Seen As Possible Complication in
Negotiations, INTERNATIONAL TRADE DAILY (July 14, 2014).
80. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, UPDATE ON THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT
PARTNERSHIP (TTIP)–FIRST NEGOTIATION ROUND 4 (2013), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2013/july/tradoc_151656.pdf.
81. Bracken, supra note 79.
82. Monika Ermert, Brief: Controversial Debate on TTIP Mandate in EU Council of Ministers,
INTELLECTUAL PROP. WATCH (June 14, 2013), http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/06/14/audiovisual-sectorout-of-eu-mandate-for-ttip/.
83. See Gabriel Siles-Brugge, ‘Race to the Bottom’ or Setting Global Standards? Assessing the
Regulatory Impact of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), REAL INSTITUTO
ELCANO (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_en/contenido?
WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari42-2014-silesbrugge-assessing-regulatory
-impact-ttip.
84. Id.
85. On the exceptionalism of financial services in TTIP, see Inu Barbee & Simone Lester,
Financial Services in the TTIP: Making the Prudential Exception Work, 45 GEORGETOWN J. INT’L L.
953 (2014). For the position of U.S. Treasury on TTIP, see Jamila Trindle & Tom Fairless, U.S. Wants
Financial Services Off Table in EU Trade Talks, WALL ST. J., (July 15, 2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323394504578607841246434144.
86. Randall, infra note 98.
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healthcare and public services or utilities has created a great push back against
87
TTIP. In the United Kingdom, this discussion has focused on the impact TTIP
may have on the U.K. National Healthcare Service with the fear that the
agreement would “lock-in” the neoliberal reforms introduced by the Cameron
88
Administration. The Commission’s response through a letter leaked to the
public has been to reassure such actors that the provision of public services will
89
be sufficiently protected in TTIP. Yet scholars have shown that the
mobilization of U.K. civil society against TTIP vis-à-vis the health sector was so
well-organized due to the prior mobilization under Prime Minister Cameron
90
against healthcare reform.
In essence, the race to the bottom critique warns of the damage of
unchecked corporate influence over regulatory processes, with minimal thought
to the power of other constituencies, primarily citizens. In response, scholars
have argued that the race to the bottom critique simply overestimates the
influence of corporations relative to that of the public interest in regulatory
91
processes. Others have argued that with respect to global regulatory standards,
exporters “have conformed their goods or services to the most stringent rules”
92
of their largest customers.
B. Regulatory Efficiency versus Democratic Participation
Whereas in past decades, scholarly debates about the normative desirability
93
of IRC have blossomed among administrative lawyers, a difference in the TPP
and TTIP negotiations is that politicians and civil society have been much more
vocal about the lack of democratic participation in IRC, especially in
megaregional free trade agreements. These concerns had been put forward by
scholars focusing on how IRC restrains the already limited possibility of public

87. Holly Jarman, Trade Policymaking Meets Social Policies: Public Statements on Healthcare and
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, http://www.icpublicpolicy.org/conference/file/
reponse/1435225750.pdf.
88. Id.
89. See Letter from Ignacio Garcia Bercero to Rt. Hon. John Healey, Chair, All-Party
Parliamentary Group on TTIP (July 8, 2014), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/july/
tradoc_152665.pdf.
90. Jarman, supra note 87.
91. VOGEL, supra note 20, at 57. After a survey of U.S. and EU trade issues, he states,
There does not appear to be a single instance in which either the United States or the EU
lowered any health, safety, or environmental standard to make its domestic producers more
competitive. . . . On the contrary, standards have moved steadily, if unevenly, upward on both
sides of the Atlantic.
92. See Thomas J. Bollyky & Anu Bradford, Getting to Yes on Transatlantic Trade, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (July 10, 2013), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139569/thomas-j-bollyky-and-anubradford/getting-to-yes-on-transatlantic-trade (demonstrating how EU rules on privacy and
competition have set high global standards, as have U.S. regulations on financial services).
93. Francesca Bignami, The Challenge of Cooperative Regulatory Relations after Enlargement, in
LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION (George A. Bermann & Katharina
Pistor
eds.,
2004),
http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1249&context=
faculty_publications.
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participation in regulatory processes. Transatlantic regulatory cooperation
justified by the need for greater efficiency added an international layer to
domestic regulatory processes with little basis in democratic procedures.
Therefore, many commentators share the view that the central challenge of IRC
under the pressure of more effective regulation is to find “new democratic
94
forms to match the new global realities.”
A variety of scholars have proposed solutions to the problem of the erosion
of democratic accountability in IRC. Ludger Kühnhardt has suggested that “the
development of democratic mechanisms outside the confines of the nation state
will, as the EU experience demonstrates, likely be an evolutionary process”—
95
hard to foster in the international context. Robert Howse suggests instead that
“allowing persons in different jurisdictions to test the quality of domestic
decision-making against alternative regimes elsewhere” could replace
96
democratic mechanisms to legitimize IRC in a kind of competitive federalism.
From a different perspective, Sol Picciotto offered a “‘directly deliberative’
model of democracy in the face of IRC, based upon forms of active citizenship,
political action, and conscious pursuit of such ‘constitutive’ principles as
97
transparency, accountability, responsibility, and empowerment.” The nature of
IRC diluting the democratic accountability of regulatory processes raises
additional substantive issues. If “the international factor” consists of maximal
98
corporate influence posited by certain public interest groups, or the maximal
influence of “international elites” (a more common suspicion among
99
academics), different methods to reconcile accountability with IRC will be
required.
For others, transatlantic regulatory cooperation offers the ability to address
100
countries’ common regulatory problems.
Many problems that national
94. Bermann, supra note 16, at 11; see also Robert Howse, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation
and the Problem of Democracy, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY CO-OPERATION: LEGAL
PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS 469–80 (George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen & Peter L.
Lindseth eds., 2000); Sol Picciotto, North Atlantic Cooperation and Democratizing Globalism, in
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY CO-OPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS
495–519 (George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2000).
95. Ludger Kühnhardt, Globalization, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation, and Democratic
Values, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY CO-OPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL
PROSPECTS 481 (George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2000).
96. Howse, supra note 94.
97. Picciotto, supra note 94.
98. Jessica Randall, International Regulatory Cooperation: Will Harmonization Protect the Public
or Prioritize Corporate Profits?, CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT (May 3, 2012),
http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/12071. She writes:
In a disturbing example [of corporate influence], “stakeholder presentations”—the only
opportunity for public input—were recently eliminated from the meetings surrounding the
negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but corporations and industry
representatives are still being invited to participate in the TPP talks. In fact, the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce—which vigorously supports legislation to undercut public protections—boasts
that its recommendations formed the basis for the U.S. negotiating positions.
99. See Picciotto, supra note 94.
100. Id.
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regulations attempt to address are either beyond the capability of any individual
country to regulate effectively alone or can be controlled more effectively
101
through cooperative processes. Pollution or other environmental damage is an
obvious example of transnational social costs that are not easily allocated.
Pollution that crosses national boundaries is beyond the scope of any national
regulation or regulator to address. More subtle collective-action problems also
arise within the reach of domestic regulation. As trade scholars have suggested,
entrenched deference to technocratic rulemaking by specialized agencies can
permanently undercut the development of globally sensitive, normative
102
guidance in the development of international standards.
In other words, even when the subject of regulation is on a domestic scale, it
might be hard or impossible for national regulators to remove inefficiencies
without a larger normative intent and without formal coordination with other
nations cooperating on the same project. Due to rapid technological
transformation, however, scholars have shown that more “sustained regulatory
103
exchange can enhance informed decision-making.” This has become one of
the central arguments in the TTIP negotiation, especially in sectors where
global standards could diverge, thereby creating losses for businesses and
regulatory conflicts. Yet for some scholars an improved transatlantic
information exchange in standard-setting could ensure regulatory overlap while
104
avoiding regulatory failures and maintaining democratic accountability.
C. Soft versus Hard Law in Administrative Law
Friction has also emerged between the EU and the U.S. approaches to
transatlantic cooperation over the choice of regulatory tools. Recommendations
and best practices reinstating the relevance of transparency, openness, and
105
participation in rulemaking initially favored the use of soft law. Whether the
EU has more frequently used its “soft power” or is an effective global standardsetting actor, many scholars have argued that it does so through a particularly
cooperative and soft approach. This approach could be described as a middle
ground between laissez-faire and socialism, or what Gráinne de Búrca has
described as a “third-way model of social democracy as an alternative means of
106
managing economic globalization.”
101. OECD, INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CO-OPERATION: ADDRESSING GLOBAL
CHALLENGES 13 (2013).
102. See Joel P. Trachtman, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation from a Trade Perspective: A Case
Study in Accounting Standards, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY CO-OPERATION 223–42 (George
A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2000) (examining the inhibiting effect that
regulatory diversity in accounting standards has had on international trade).
103. See Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 49.
104. Bollyky & Bradford, supra note 92.
105. U.S.–EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON REGULATORY PRINCIPLES
AND BEST PRACTICES (2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/commonunderstanding-on-regulatory-principles-and-best-practices.pdf.
106. See Grainne de Burca, Europe’s Raison D’Etre 11 (N.Y.U. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13-09, 2013).
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For instance, soft law was at the center of MRAs in transatlantic regulatory
cooperation that allowed certain industry sectors to set common procedural
baselines for standard settings for their products that initially could not freely
107
circulate among EU Member States. MRAs were in fact based on the
willingness of the parties to share information and reach closer cooperation
while avoiding hard implementation measures or penalties for the failure to
108
implement them. In addition, the Commission has put forward its preference
for Agency-to-Agency cooperation, allowing independent agencies to
coordinate and exchange information at different phases and through formal or
informal relations.
In contrast to the EU’s soft-law approach, the USTR has proposed a
centralized supervision of IRC similar to that of the OMB in the White
109
House. This Office, supervising other agencies, would directly bind other
operators to function under a set of administrative principles, such as costbenefit analysis or the notice-and-comment rulemaking processes as a way to
110
allow stakeholders to offer individual feedback to regulation.
Another example of institutional innovation through hard law is the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), a federal agency created in
111
1980 that is part of the OMB and falls under the President’s direction. In
practice, however, agencies sometimes use different strategies to avoid OIRA’s
widespread review to dodge political conflicts or onerous procedures that lead
to a complex dynamic of avoidance and cooperation depending on the
112
administrative actors and circumstances. In the leaked chapter on regulatory
coherence of the TPP, there was a clear attempt by the USTR to encourage
other governments to adopt an OIRA-style mechanism. The impulse to create a
central body with higher status was geared to better coordinate, under the
direction of the executive branch, the development of regulation, the decisionmaking processes in the agencies, and the implementation of good regulatory
practices based on a standardized cost-benefit analysis and Regulatory Impact
107. See Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R.
I-649; see also EU Position Paper, EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Technical
Barriers to Trade, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151627.pdf.
108. Shaffer, supra note 18.
109. See TiIPING Point, The Regulatory Component, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Feb. 25, 2015,
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/021460_TTIP_Regulatory_Paper_FIN.p
df. For an opposite perspective about the increasing and distorting power of OMB, see TACD,
Resolution on Regulatory Coherence in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Doc. 16/13,
(December
2013),
http://test.tacd.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/TACD-TTIP-Resolution-onRegulatory-Coherence-in-the-Transatlantic-Trade-and-Investment-Partnership.pdf.
110. Takacs, supra note 47, at 87.
111. OIRA was created by Congress in the 1980s under the Carter Administration. Later on with
President Reagan’s EO 12,291, OIRA became an effective centralizing supervisor of agency
rulemaking by requiring cost-benefit analyses for a wide range of proposed rules. About OIRA, THE
WHITE HOUSE—OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira/about (last
visited Nov. 28, 2015).
112. Nina A. Mendelson & Jonathan B. Wiener, Responses to Agency Avoidance of OIRA, 37
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 447 (2014).
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113

Assessments.
In both TPP and TTIP negotiations, the USTR has put forward its
administrative and regulatory apparatus as exemplary for other negotiating
parties due to its centralized and participatory procedures. For instance, the
U.S. administration prides itself on its notice-and-comment process to agency
rulemaking that ensures a high level of participation ranging from economic
actors to civil society at large while requiring agencies to take into consideration
the public comments under the threat of litigation. Although in practice this
process does not entail “effective” opportunities for participation—agencies are
not required to monitor participation and “solicit underrepresented groups”—
at least at the negotiation table USTR can put forward its notice-and-comment
114
process as a hard model for regulatory participation.
Beyond the hard-versus-soft-law divide, IRC requires a high level of
administrative law expertise and EU–U.S. comparative studies, which are often
sponsored by the main actors. This expertise allows trade negotiators to use
technical and neutral tools as a way to avoid more overtly political issues, such
as addressing how the costs and benefits of free-trade agreements are
115
redistributed in practice.
IV
FROM GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TO GLOBAL EXPERIMENTAL
GOVERNANCE
A. Global Administrative Law and Its Critics
One of the challenges for IRC remains how to achieve regulatory
convergence or cooperation by translating broad global governance principles
into divergent administrative cultures. In principle, trade negotiators might
have converging aspirations of what appear to be “best” administrative law
practices and institutional arrangements. Scholars of GAL have put forward an
ambitious set of administrative law principles by taking the regulatory regime
created by the WTO as a model. GAL scholars begin with the premise that the
forces of globalization are gradually altering the international legal order and

113. TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (TPP)—REGULATORY COHERENCE, as
published
by
CITIZENS
TRADE
CAMPAIGN,
http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wpcontent/uploads/2011/10/TransPacificRegulatoryCoherence.pdf.
114. See Wendy Wagner, Participation in US Administrative Process, in FRANCESCA BIGNAMI AND
DAVID ZARING, ELGAR HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW AND REGULATION (forthcoming 2016).
115. See RICHARD PARKER & ALBERT ALEMANNO, COMMISSION REPORT—TOWARDS
EFFECTIVE REGULATORY COOPERATION UNDER TTIP: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE EU
US
LEGISLATIVE
AND
REGULATORY
SYSTEMS
65
(2014),
AND
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152466.pdf
(“The
challenge
for
TTIP
negotiators is to find an effective mechanism for enabling these two disparate systems to work more
effectively, efficiently, and cooperatively together. That exploration will be aided by a clear
understanding of how the two legislative and regulatory systems work currently in their separate
spheres.”).
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that much of this change is regulatory and administrative in nature.
For proponents of GAL, areas as diverse as United Nations Security
Council decisions on asset freezing, World Bank rulemaking, and Financial
Action Task Force standard-setting are all equal evidence that international
institutions are aggressively asserting their reach into the domestic realm
through general principles such as transparency, accountability, and
participation. However, these global administrative law principles trickle down
in ways that challenge the traditional distinction between domestic and
117
international law. As such, GAL “encompasses procedures and normative
standards for regulatory decisionmaking that falls outside domestic legal
structures and yet is not properly covered by existing international law, which
traditionally governs state-to-state relations rather than the exercise of
118
regulatory authority with direct or indirect effects on individuals.”
The first set of criticisms raised against GAL focused on the rise in power
and influence of international regulatory regimes and the resulting
accountability gaps, as well as important changes to domestic law that bypass
119
traditional domestic political and legal limitations. This happens when global
regimes lacking domestic accountability adopt regulatory norms, which are then
implemented through domestic regulation. Changes to domestic regulations
often circumvent the traditional requirement of state consent through treaties
120
because they “operate below or outside the treaty system.”
In response, proponents of GAL have put forward a bottom-up extension of
121
domestic administrative law principles to the international level. In reaction to
demands for accountability in a globalized world, GAL scholars have proposed
to make global administrative decisions more reasoned rather than more
122
democratic, whereas others have called upon national administrations to
respect procedural global standards while reconciling them with domestic
123
standard.
Another critique leveled against GAL was that it reflected Western
116. See Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global
Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2006).
117. Id. at 3.
118. Simon Chesterman, Globalization Rules: Accountability, Power and the Prospects for Global
Administrative Law, 14 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 39, 39 (2008).
119. Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?, 68
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 69 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
120. See Richard B. Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge to U.S. Administrative Law, 37
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 695, 695 (2005).
121. See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 17 (2005) (defining GAL as comprising the
mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting social understandings that promote or otherwise
affect the accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring they meet adequate
standards of transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and legality, and by providing effective
review of the rules and decisions they make).
122. Chesterman, supra note 118, at 39–40.
123. Sabino Cassese, Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 110–11 (2005).
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conceptions of administrative law, thus dismissing developing nations’ legal
regimes. The principles GAL embodies have their origins in the rise of the
liberal state and the expansion of regulatory functions in the late nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, and these origins may be difficult to transplant to other
124
parts of the world. GAL was similarly criticized for its form of “imperialism”
that mainly benefited Northern industrialized countries at the expense of the
125
rest of the world. B.S. Chimini, for example, argued, “GAL is today being
shaped by a [Transnational Capitalist Class] that seeks to legitimize unequal
126
laws and institutions and deploy it to its advantage.” However, even within
the West, there is considerable diversity in the ways national regulators
127
approach the basic administrative law principles that form the core of GAL.
Critics and proponents have rejected the assumption that GAL, taken to its
logical conclusion, suggests that national administrative procedures will
converge over time as general principles of Western administrative law spread
through the implementation of agreements negotiated under international
128
regulatory regimes. Both debates spurred by these concerns about GAL show
that the operationalization of global administrative principles entails
cooperation and political compromises that are contextual to the specific set of
institutions and interests at stake.
B. Experimental and Problem-Solving Approaches to Global Governance
Critics of global regulation argue that regulatory variation allows for
experimentation by which states can learn about the impacts of different
policies. These experiments might include policy variation in practice,
diversification as protection from errors, innovative experimentation, and
studying transitions over time from variation to convergence.
A new theory supporting this idea, mentioned briefly in part I, supra, is
GXG. This is conceptualized as an institutionalized process of participatory and
multilevel collective problem-solving, where problems are framed in an open129
ended way and subject to review in light of local knowledge. For GXG to
124. Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 121, at 51.
125. Id.
126. See B.S. Chimni, Cooption and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative Law 7 (Inst.
Int’l
Law
and
Justice,
Working
Paper
No.
2005/16,
2005),
http://www.iilj.org/publications/2005WorkingPapers.asp; see also Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra
note 121, at 51 (“[A]n international order based on individual or economic rights may be too close to a
Western, liberal conceptions to be universally acceptable.”); Nico Krisch, The Pluralism of Global
Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 247, 248 (2006) (arguing that forcing global governance into a
coherent and unified framework is normatively undesirable).
127. See Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values, 17 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 187, 193, 208 (2006).
128. See John Bell, Mechanisms for Cross-Fertilisation of Administrative Law in Europe, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 147 (Jack Beatson & Takis Tridmas eds.,1998) (identifying
the ways in which administrative law is converging and diverging between countries).
129. Grainne de Burca, Robert O. Keohane & Charles F. Sabel, Global Experimentalist
Governance 2 (N.Y.U. Sch. Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 1444, 2014).
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occur, multiple deliberation-fostering steps must take place. Proponents of
GXG advocate horizontal sectoral agreements to create a transatlantic
regulatory laboratory that could be implemented in TTIP. For example, within
a country, the federal government can monitor different policy implementations
in various states and adopt the best policy to apply to all. However, the
international legal community lacks a central government able to monitor,
assess, and implement these experimental policies. GXG further argues that
“nested institution at multiple levels can, when linked together in particular
ways, cohere into an innovative form of learning organization,” placing the
131
burden of monitoring and review on peers in a horizontal structure.
If GAL fails to account for the potential mismatch between local
preferences and circumstances—because harmonization discounts local
governments’ policymaking and preferences—GHX, in contrast, recognizes
international-trade gains not only from comparative advantages but also by
acquiring skills across different countries. Regulatory variation could increase
gains from trade and additional information-sharing by taking into account
locally formed opinions. However, proponents of GXG outline some of its
underlying and necessary conditions, such as uncertain and diverse
environments, commitment of key actors on basic principles, and cooperation
132
among newly formed civil society actors as agenda-setters or problem-solvers.
In the same vein, Alberto Alemanno and Jonathan Wiener show that
regulatory variation can be carried out in many different ways to achieve
133
learning from variation. Differences in impact can be observed and thus
inform improvement, as in the laboratory of federalism cited by Judge
134
Brandeis. This approach would be effective on an international scale because
of the broad variation of approaches. Further, variation could be examined in
purposeful experimentation from a university research setting to practical
135
policies.
Alemanno and Wiener address their experimental approach in TTIP under
the presumption that the penalty for noncooperation is a high economic loss
and that both the EU and United States share Western administrative law
values. They argue in favor of an experimentalist laboratory with a central
governing body that should monitor and select best practices for regulatory
136
lawmaking. The regulatory cooperation body exemplifies this idea through a
permanent mechanism that will identify sectors where new regulations may be
aligned through monitoring and exchanging information on principles,
130. Id.
131. Id. at 4.
132. Id. at 13.
133. Jonathan B. Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, The Future of International Regulatory
Cooperation: TTIP as a Learning Process toward a Global Policy Laboratory, 78 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 4, 2015, at 132–35.
134. See New State Ice Co. v Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
135. Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 133, at 127.
136. Id.at 19–21.
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procedures on participation, and impact assessments, with the goal of providing
137
a gateway to manage any regulatory issues impacting trade. This method
incorporates learning from regulatory variation by addressing regulatory
divergence as a complex phenomenon. Rather than circumventing
representative democracy, new institutional and regulatory mechanisms will
allow the creation of a regulatory laboratory and a living agreement that can be
modified without reopening the existing agreement between the EU and the
United States.
According to these administrative lawyers, experimentalist features will
induce regulators in the EU and the United States to consider the
extraterritorial impact of their policies and will lead them to align their
138
regulatory outcomes. This may occur through mutual recognition of existing
standards or in relation to new or revised regulations. This transatlantic
laboratory will further allow regulators to discuss their solutions to different
administrative practices and to gather public input that is essential for the
139
success of their trade and investment partnership at all stages. Only then will
regulators be able to decide whether and how regulations can converge by
identifying areas that could become legally binding and thus subject to
enforcement. Experimentalist lawyers aim to reconcile conflicting interests by
balancing reasons that can universally apply to identify best practices, allowing
each country to decide if and how regulatory convergence should occur.
V
POLITICIZING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW EXPERTISE
A. Comparative Law Approaches to Market Regulation
Since its launch, one of the main goals of IRC has been to remove arbitrary
regulatory differences in domestic administrative approaches. Lawyers have
been enlisted with the goal of achieving better regulatory cooperation and
comparing existing differences and the similarities in regulatory approaches that
value transparency, openness, and participation. Comparative lawyers have
highlighted the existence of different European and U.S. approaches to market
regulation. To show these differences, some have used a “law in the books”
140
approach to map the divergence between EU and U.S. regulatory processes,
141
while others have opted for a “law in context” or an “intellectual history”
142
approach.
137. See EUROPEAN UNION, TEXTUAL PROPOSAL FOR LEGAL TEXT ON “REGULATORY
COOPERATION” IN TTIP 11, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/february/tradoc_153120.pdf.
138. Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 133 at 129–30.
139. Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 133 at 129–31.
140. See Parker & Alemanno, supra note 115.
141. GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO
LITIGATION (2003).
142. See James Q. Whitman, Consumerism versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law, 117
YALE L. J. 340, 383–84 (2007).
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From a law-in-the-books perspective, lawyers have demonstrated a
143
fundamental divergence in administrative law regimes. Lawyers have focused
first on the differences existing between primary legislation that encompasses
bills and legislation, and second, on the differences between secondary
legislation that encompasses the regulatory process. They have come to the
conclusion that in the United States, public participation in primary legislation
is haphazard, while secondary regulation is exposed to broad input from
individual stakeholders via the notice-and-comment procedure established to
144
make sure that interested individuals can participate in rulemaking. In other
words, administrative agencies adopting secondary legislation though informal
rulemaking procedures need to offer the public a chance to provide comments
145
to the proposed regulations. Agencies respond to individual comments from
stakeholders according to court decisions interpreting the APA or their internal
statutes.
In contrast, primary legislation in the EU is the result of broad consultation
of stakeholders and institutional actors representing institutional market
146
actors. In the EU, stakeholder input comes much earlier in the process, and
the institutional stakeholders are largely involved and offer input at the primary
legislation stage; in the United States, in contrast, individual stakeholders play
147
an important role later, during regulatory lawmaking.
This divergence in administrative processes also reflects a more “proactive”
EU approach to market economies as opposed to a more “reactive” U.S.
approach. To explain such divergence, James Whitman’s work shows how
European countries, especially France and Germany, have focused on producer
interests due to the view that the basic problem of law and politics is reconciling
148
conflicting interests of different producer groups. Consequently, economic
legislation in the EU has revolved around the conflicts between producer
groups as well as labor law. In the United States, however, the focus has
historically been on consumers—members of a universal class sharing a
149
common interest in buying things that are “cheap” and “good.”
Another example of the divergence in EU–U.S. administrative processes is
apparent in U.S. antitrust law, in which regulators seek to avoid behavior that
would undermine individual interests, whereas EU competition law protects
143. See Parker & Alemanno, supra note 115 (highlighting fundamental differences in what
regulators define as primary versus secondary legislation in the EU and the United States).
144. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
145. JEFFREY LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 274 (5th ed. 2012).
146. For example, see the feedback solicited from stakeholders by the European Commission on its
White and Green Papers to initiate, stimulate, and propose legislative action. EUROPEAN COMMISSION
GREEN PAPERS, http://ec.europa.eu/green-papers/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2015).
147. See Susan E. Dudley and Kay Wegrich, Achieving Regulatory Policy Objectives: An Overview
and Comparison of U.S. and EU Procedures 33 (2015),http://regulatorystudies.columbian.
gwu.edu/sites/regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Dudley-Wegrich_USEU_RegOverview.pdf.
148. Whitman, supra note 142.
149. Id. at 361.
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business interests by preventing distortion of the field by a dominant interest. It
can be argued that, as a result of these histories, the EU market is dominated by
institutional participants, whereas individual and business participants dominate
in the U.S. market.
In a similar way, through a law-in-context approach, Gregory Shaffer has
showed how private parties are challenging trade barriers through the WTO
regime. In foregrounding the cultural and socioeconomic differences among
private litigants and public officials, Shaffer shows different types of access to
WTO disputes, with individual businesses in the United States doing most of
the work rather than a stronger institutional presence like the Commission in
150
the EU.
Even though comparative lawyers have explained in detail the reasons for
the existing differences in transatlantic regulatory cooperation, scholars have
often facilitated and promoted new knowledge for the TTIP negotiation.
Because legal expertise is increasingly relevant to trade negotiators, what
initially appeared as a neutral comparison has become a bargaining chip for
trade negotiators engaging in regulatory cooperation.
B. Transparency as a Neutral Principle or a Bargaining Tool
EU and U.S. trade negotiators alike continuously strive to achieve greater
transparency in the TTIP negotiation in order to increase the legitimacy of a
trade negotiation process suffering from an inherent democratic deficit. USTR
representative Michael Froman stated that “[t]ransparency, participation,
accountability—these are core to the U.S. regulatory system, but they are not
151
uniquely American principles,”
while his counterpart, EU Trade
Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, claimed, “I have transparency in my DNA,
152
and I hope I can inject it also in TTIP negotiations.”
At the declaratory level, convergence exists on the meaning of the principle
of transparency that each system uses to make its processes more open and
accountable to the public. This includes the availability and ease of access by
the public to information held by the government and the ability to observe and
153
become informed about regulatory decisionmaking. At the abstract level,
transparency and public participation can promote democratic legitimacy and
economic efficiency by strengthening the connections between government
agencies and the public they serve, as well as by enhancing the credibility of
150. See SHAFFER, supra note 141.
151. Remarks by US Trade Representative Michael Froman on the United States, the European
Union, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (Sept. 30, 2013) (transcript available at
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/10/20131001283902.html#axzz3Q4vuUlAm).
152. TTIP, TWITTER.COM, https://twitter.com/search?q=ttip&src=typd.
153. See Cary Coglianese et al., Transparency and Public Participation in the Federal Rulemaking
Process: Recommendations for the New Administration, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 926 (2009); see
also Michelle Limenta, Open Trade Negotiations as Opposed to Secret Trade Negotiations: From
Transparency to Public Participation, 10 N.Z. Y.B. INT’L. L. 73 (2012) (explaining that transparency is
used widely in many different contexts and that there is no generally acceptable definition of it).
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trade negotiations.
Even though negotiators are committed to transparency and participation
through the involvement of the U.S. Congress or the European Parliament, in
the realm of regulatory cooperation and its operationalization, ambiguity
surrounds the meaning of transparency, openness, and participation in the
155
regulatory processes.
A central objective of the USTR concerning transparency “is to obtain
broader application of the principle of transparency and clarification of the
156
costs and benefits of trade policy actions.” Under this rationale, the USTR has
tried to implement robust transparency initiatives. In 2014, as a result of various
pressures from civil society and industries alike, Mr. Froman announced the
creation of an innovative forum, namely a Public Interest Trade Advisory
Committee (PITAC) for academics and NGOs, as part of the trade advisory
committee structure. One of the paradoxical provisions of the PITAC was,
however, that every participant was obliged to sign a nondisclosure agreement
so that civil society participants could not openly discuss or promote the
information they acquired during the PITAC meetings. Some have criticized
this institution as adding opacity, rather than transparency, to the whole
157
process. Finally, a new bill for consideration in the U.S. Congress calls for the
establishment of a Chief Transparency Officer in USTR who will “consult with
Congress on transparency policy, coordinate transparency in trade negotiations,
158
engage and assist the public,” and advise the USTR.
Via the notice-and-comment procedure in secondary regulation, the U.S.
administration has gained a first-mover advantage position vis-à-vis the EU for
being more transparent and accessible to individuals interested in participating
159
in rulemaking. As a consequence, the USTR has questioned its counterpart
for lacking transparency in its rulemaking procedures that do not offer
160
individuals a systematic opportunity to comment on the proposed regulations.
Additionally, U.S. businesses have attacked the Commission for several
reasons, including: opacity in publishing its initial drafts before their
154. Cary Coglianese et al., Transparency and Public Participation in the Rulemaking Process, A
Nonpartisan Presidential Transition Task Force Report, Task Force Report, v, vi–vii (2008),
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/transparencyReport.pdf.
155. See RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRANSPARENCY (Padideh Ala’i & Robert G. Vaughn eds.,
2014).
156. 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(3) (2012).
157. Maira Sutton, U.S. Trade Rep on the Charm Offensive—Slight Tweaks to Secret TPP Process is
Far
from
Enough,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUNDATION
(Feb.
24,
2014),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/us-trade-rep-charm-offensive-slight-tweaks-secret-tpp-processfar-enough.
158. Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, H.R. 1890, 114th
Cong. (2015).
159. See Abraham Newman and Elliot Posner, Putting the EU in Its Place: Policy Strategies and the
Global Regulatory Context (unpublished comment, on file with the European Union Studies
Association), https://eustudies.org/conference/papers/download/42.
160. See Shawn Donnan, US Pushes for Greater Transparency in EU Business Regulation, FIN.
TIMES, (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6e9b7190-9a65-11e3-8e06-00144feab7de.html.
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introduction to the European Parliament and the Council under the ordinary
legislative procedure and the failure to provide individual comments for the
Commission’s delegated legislation. Interestingly, this limitation in access has
been portrayed by businesses and USTR alike as a lack of transparency rather
161
than as an attempt to limit the influence of corporate lobbies in Brussels.
The principle of transparency in the EU can be found in Article 15(3) of the
162
Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union.
This provides that any
citizen or person residing in a member state shall have access to documents of
its institutions, agencies, and offices, subject to limitations, operationalized
163
through a regulation. The Commission publishes an electronic questionnaire
for all stakeholders to send in their views; sets up meetings in Brussels for
participation from consumer groups, industry associations and NGO’s; conducts
an independent study to analyze the economic, social, and environmental
impacts of agreements; and creates a dialogue with Council, European
164
Parliament, and the member states.
Soon after the transparency critiques of the TTIP negotiation came from
civil society, the European Parliament, which gained more power in vetoing
international agreements after the Lisbon Treaty, similarly voiced its
disagreement with TTIP. Not surprisingly, the European Parliament’s worries
resonated with the European Ombudsman, who feared that the TTIP
negotiation was not transparent and disproportionately favored some corporate
165
groups at the expense of other civil society groups.
The Commission’s reaction to the USTR position did not take long, and in
2014, with the newly elected Junker Commission, the trajectory of negotiations
166
changed. The “transparency package” put forward by Trade Commissioner
Cecilia Malmström has proven, at least at the declaratory level, to be a strong
167
response to Froman’s attacks. In her proposal Malmström suggested to fully
inform the European Parliament, rather than just the members of Parliament,
on the international trade committee about the next steps of the TTIP
168
negotiation. She then put the Commission back in the front seat of the
161. USTR, 2014 Report on Technical Barriers to Trade 46 (2014).
162. TFEU art. 15(3).
163. See Regulation 1049/2001/EC (noting that the regulation only allows access to the documents
of “institutions” and not “institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies” as in Article 15(3)).
164. European
Commission
Factsheet,
Transparency
in
EU
Trade
Negotiations,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/june/tradoc_151381.pdf.
165. EU Ombudsman
Demands More TTIP Transparency, EURACTIV (July 31, 2014),
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/trade-industry/eu-ombudsman-demands-more-ttip-transparency303831.
166. European Commission, Communication to the Commission Concerning Transparency in TTIP
Negotiations (2014), http://ec.europa.eu/news/2014/docs/c_2014_9052_en.pdf.
167. Commission Launches Transparency Initiative for TTIP and Lobbying, EURACTIV (Nov. 20,
2014),
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/commission-launches-transparencyinitiative-ttip-and-lobbying-310183.
168.diSee generally Communication to the Commission Concerning Transparency in TTIP
Negotiations (Nov. 25, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/news/2014/docs/c_2014_9052_en.pdf (endorsing
Commissioner Malmström’s approach).
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transparency game through online publications open to the general public on
169
the EU position in each round of the TTIP negotiation. Finally, she launched
an open consultation about the controversial Investor-to-State-Dispute
Settlement (ISDS) clause in TTIP and provided a report responding to the
170
nearly 150,000 replies.
Even though the Commission’s approach to the negotiation has been
innovative and informative, and has received important media attention while
also regaining a first-mover advantage vis-à-vis the USTR, the trade-offs and
171
the political choices made by the trade negotiators remain highly secretive.
C. Hermeneutic of Suspicion and Distributive Consequences of Transparency
With the apparent goal of making the process more legitimate and
democratic, transparency claims in TTIP end up empowering different interest
groups. These transparency claims allow public and private interest groups with
different constituencies across the Atlantic to form transnational alliances,
catalyze the negotiating process, and create more opacity on the meaning of
172
transparency. Members from industry to consumer groups, in particular those
affected by some key sectors in TTIP such as automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and
medical devices, are very active in stating their position, sponsoring new
research, and providing money for academic studies to influence the
negotiators’ views and generate greater knowledge of transparency in TTIP.
In applying the “hermeneutic of suspicion” to the general principle of
transparency, legal scholars question whether “outcomes either follow from
particular ideologies or represent compromises of conflicting ideologies, rather
173
than of conflicting universal principles and values.” For example, the
underlying political ideologies in TTIP can taint the choices of the negotiators
and lawyers drafting the regulatory cooperation provisions. There is an
ideological spectrum with an ideology that, on the one hand, protects the
decisions by sovereign states to avoid a race-to-the-bottom scenario and to limit
free trade regimes. On the other hand, the opposite ideological position stems
from the fact that trade liberalization offers gains in terms of economic benefits
ranging from efficiency in regulatory governance to setting transatlantic
169. EU
Negotiating
Texts
in
TTIP
(2015),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/
index.cfm?id=1230.
170. See Commission Report on Online Public Consultation on Investment Protection and Investorto-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement
(TTIP), (Jan. 13, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153044.pdf.
171. Christian Oliver, EU Pushes Back Against TTIP Trade Agreement Secrecy, FIN. TIMES, (Jan. 1,
2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fe54facc-968b-11e4-a83c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3QaaVX4Fd.
172. See H. Patrick Glenn, Transparency and Closure, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
TRANSPARENCY (Padideh Ala’i & Robert G. Vaughn eds., 2014) (addressing what Glenn calls the
paradox of transparency, which create insiders and outsiders. For instance, in the case of TTIP
transparency is a bargaining tool that paradoxically legitimates a setting, a secret trade negotiation, in
which the norm remains closure).
173. See Duncan Kennedy, Political Ideology and Comparative Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 35, 36 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012).
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standards for international trade. These two ideological poles are situated on a
spectrum ranging from a more social to a more neoliberal vision of market
economies. Along this ideological continuum, trade negotiators make different
choices about the meaning and the function of transparency as a central
principle in transatlantic regulatory cooperation.
A second type of hermeneutic of suspicion goes hand in hand with the
balancing of conflicting considerations that lawyers will have to promote vis-àvis an ex ante or ex post approach to regulation. Proponents of regulatory
cooperation agree that the EU takes a more “proactive” approach whereas the
U.S. uses a “reactive” approach to regulate its markets. As a result, EU
economic regulation invites producers and labor groups to the negotiation table
early on through institutional channels in a neocorporativist fashion. On the
other hand, the U.S. regulatory focus is reactive insofar as it invites, ex post, a
plurality of stakeholders to participate in the regulatory process after the
proposed rule is released. Not only businesses but also consumers, as members
of a universal class, are invited to the stakeholder consultation table. As
Francesca Bignami has indicated, these different regulatory styles are
characterized either by neocorporatism in the EU or pluralism in the United
174
States.
In EU and U.S. decision-making processes, the principle of transparency is
fundamental in the regulation of market economy. Because of the malleability
of the transparency concept, this principle does not have objective functions,
175
nor does it reflect universal values. Transparency is a notion embedded in
administrative, economic, and social structures through which it acquires
political value. Rather than in opposition to one another, the function of this
principle can be explained on a continuum ranging between different
institutional choices exemplified by green and white papers aimed at particular
stakeholders, agency-to-agency cooperation, notice-and-comment rulemaking,
and regulatory impact assessments.
At one end of the spectrum is a “proactive” or ex ante pole whereby
agencies use transparency to ensure fair and equal participation for different
economic actors, such as businesses, unions, consumers, and civil society, in the
regulatory process. This pole’s focus is on how to structure ex ante access to the
regulatory process by soliciting participation of more vulnerable economic
groups while controlling excessive corporate lobbying. At the other end of the
spectrum is the “reactive,” ex post approach to transparency that includes all
the interested individuals in secondary regulatory processes. The ex post focus
is not so much about ensuring that the entire society is on board with the
regulatory process, but rather, it is about ensuring that all the interested parties

174. See Francesca Bignami, Introduction, in FRANCESCA BIGNAMI AND DAVID ZARING, ELGAR
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW AND REGULATION (forthcoming 2016) (relying on the diverse
approach to pluralism in the United States and the neocorporatism in the EU when mapping
differences and similarities in comparative regulation).
175. See RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 155.
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in a regulatory process can be heard.
Figure 1
Proactive
Stakeholders
Civil Society

Businesses

Welfarism

Neoliberalism

NGOs

Corporate Lobbies

Individuals

Reactive
In understanding the different functions of transparency, any proposal on
IRC becomes a contextual and contingent one—determined by political
ideologies such as a more welfarist or neoliberal views of market economics, as
well as considerations over proactive or reactive approaches to regulate
markets. Each regulatory choice can be positioned on the table above, thus
creating benefits or costs to particular groups in markets and societies.
VI
CONCLUSION
Lawyers who have been involved in the TTIP negotiations and made some
transparency claims have not openly engaged with the hermeneutic of
suspicions in comparative law. While their work is either sponsored or used
politically by trade negotiators and lobbyists, the lawyers continue to portray
regulatory cooperation as a neutral or experimentalist process that remains
176
technical rather than political.
As a result, transparency claims make the TTIP negotiation seem more
democratic, when in fact they enable negotiators to leverage their positions vis176. Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 133, at 128; see also Fernanda Nicola, The Paradox of
Transparency: The Politics of Regulatory Cooperation in the TTIP Negotiation, SIDIBLOG (Feb. 4,
2015), http://www.sidi-isil.org/sidiblog/?p=1298.
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à-vis others. Because of this increasing strategic use of transparency claims, the
role of legal scholarship is crucial to ensure the production of critical knowledge
about transatlantic regulatory cooperation. Scholars have become the
manufacturers of legal knowledge that can be effectively used and sponsored by
trade negotiations irrespective of its normative backdrops. Instead of
comparing administrative legal regimes to find similarities or differences
between U.S. and EU regulatory processes, this article suggests foregrounding
the distributive consequences of transparency claims for different groups
affected by transatlantic trade.

